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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CARL L. PINGREE, JAMES W. PINGREE,
WALLACE B. PINGREE and JOYCE P.
SPARROW, trustees,
Plaintiffs, Respondents, and
Cross-Appellants,
vs.

Case No. 14484

THE CONTINENTAL GROUP OF UTAH,
INC., a Utah corporation, and
LESLIE W. VAN ANTWERP, JR., doing
business as VAN'S BLUE OX,
Defendants, Appellants, and
Cross-Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
AND CROSS-APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
This case includes claims for declaratory judgment,
unlawful detainer, damages and accounting.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Honorable John F. Wahlquist, sitting without a
jury, entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Judgment and Decree which set the rental for the first
renewal term of the lease at $900 per month, found that the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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appellant was in unlawful detention of the premises for
breach of lease covenants, awarded damages, ordered that an
accounting be made and that appellant vacate the premises as
of January 15, 1976.

Appellant's Motion for. Reconsideration

of Judgment was denied.

The Judgment and Decree was appealed

by defendant, and plaintiffs cross-appealed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL
Plaintiffs, respondents, and cross-appellants
request this Court to reverse, modify or affirm the trial
court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment
and Decree as follows:
1.

Reverse and delete Finding of Fact No. 59,

which reads, "The uncertain lease situation is not the type
that the legislature had in mind in fixing treble damages
for unlawful holdover."
2.

Modify Findings of Fact Nos. 60 and 64 to

permit respondents to recover treble damages for unlawful
holdover of the premises from and after March 4, 1975, to
and including January 15, 1976, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 1953, §78-36-1, et seq.
3.

Reverse part of Conclusion of Law No. 16 and

all of Conclusion of Law No. 18(k) so as to permit the

- 2 -

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

recovery of treble damages from and after March 4, 1975, to
and including January 15, 1976, for unlawful holdover of the
premises.
4.

Modify part of Conclusion of Law No. 14 and

all of Conclusion of Law No. 18(g) so as to award respondents
treble damages for unlawful holdover of the premises from
and after March 4, 1975, to January 15, 1976.
5.

Modify paragraphs No. 2 and No. 5 of the

Judgment and Decree so as to award respondents and crossappellants judgment for treble damages as a result of the
unlawful holdover.
6.

Reverse and delete paragraph No. 6 of the

Judgment and Decree.
7.

Affirm the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

Law, and Judgment and Decree in all other respects.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs, respondents, and cross-appellants
(hereinafter referred to as "respondents'1) disagree with
defendant, appellant, and cross-respondentfs (hereinafter
referred to as "appellant11) Statement of Facts in several
material respects.

The controlling facts in the view of the

respondents are set forth below.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The respondents are the owners of a restaurant
located at 5418 South 1900 West, Roy, Utah (T.190, Complaint
para. 1-4, Answer para. 1-4). This property is located
within the main Roy City shopping district (T.191).

Respon-

dents1 predecessor-in-interest, Ma's & Pa's Place, a Utah
corporation ("Ma's & Pa's"), operated this restaurant until
sometime during 1967 or 1968 (T.174, 205).
The restaurant building was erected in 1948 (T.205)
on a lot 225 feet deep and 158 feet wide fronting on the
east side of 1900 West (T.208, Plaintiffs' Exhibit A ) .

This

street is the main north-south thoroughfare in Roy, Utah
(T.355).

Within a block to the north of the premises is the

Riverdale Road junction, and to the south is the Roy 1-15
exit (T.190, 355).
To the south is located a Denny's restaurant, Roy
Lumber Company, Taco Time, the Rainbow Bar, a gas station
and a motel.

On the north side is D & B Garage and at the

Riverdale Road junction, Roy Auto (T.217, 218). Up until
the time Ma's & Pa's ceased operating the restaurant, it was
the only restaurant in the immediate vicinity on the east
side of the street (T.218).
The premises were subsequently leased to the Hicks
to operate a Tampico restaurant (T.175, 205, 372). This
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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lease was for a five year term with rentals of $1,000 per
month (T.175, 205, 206). After the business had been operating
approximately seven months, the Hicks took out bankruptcy
(T.206).
The Continental Group of Utah, Inc. ("Continental11) ,
had obtained a national "Paul Bunyan" restaurant franchise
(T.191, 192, 274). On September 12, 1969, the respondents
entered into an Earnest Money Lease Agreement with Continental
to lease the premises for a five year term, plus two fiveyear renewal options (T.177, 239). The Earnest Money Agreement provided for rentals of $500 per month, plus 3 percent
of the gross sales over $10,000 per month for the initial
five year period.

In succeeding renewal periods, the base

rent was left at $500 per month while the percentage rental
was increased to 4 percent of gross sales over $10,000 per
month (Defendant's Exhibit 1).
After the Earnest Money Agreement had been executed,
Continental revised the Hicks-Tampico lease (T.175-177), and
this revised lease was executed by the parties on September
24, 1969 (Plaintiffs1 Exhibit A).

Contrary to the terms of

the Earnest Money Agreement, this lease called for the renegotiation of the rentals for each successive renewal term

- 5 -
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with the proviso that the maximum monthly rent be fixed at
$900 per month.

In addition, Continental negotiated for and

obtained the right to terminate the lease upon 90 days
notice (T.211, para. 4 of Exhibit C to Plaintiffs' Exhibit A)
in the event it was unable to make more than $10,000 per
month (T.211).

In fact, Continental represented to Ma's &

Pa's that it would vacate the premises if gross sales dropped
below $10,000 per month (T.211) since the corporation would
be losing money at that sales level.

This was agreeable to

Ma's & Pa's since it was losing money by renting the premises
for less than $900 per month (T.212).
At the time Continental obtained possession of the
premises, they were in good condition (T.199, 244, 269-270,
277-278).

Although the building had been constructed in

1948 (T.205), the exterior had recently been repainted and
the building interior had been completely remodeled and
repainted by the Hicks (T.198).

During the Hicks occupancy,

there had been a small fire in the kitchen (T.199).

Follow-

ing the Hicks occupancy, the building was completely cleaned
and scrubbed down (T.199-200).

The floors and the paint

were in good condition and repair (T.200, 277), and the
restrooms were in good repair and in operation (T.200, 243245).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The interior decor of the building did not suit
Continental.

It undertook at its own cost (T.202) to remodel

the main dining room and the coffee shop, remove the upstairs
dance floor, relocate the public restrooms, and add a walkin box (T.201-202, 240-242).
Continental was to do the necessary remodeling and
maintain all things in the restaurant.
care of everything.

!f

[W]e would take

If there was [sic] any repairs to be

done, or anything like that we would take care of them, and
we did." (T.240)
The original lease between Continental and Ma's &
Pa's did not include glassware, silverware and other items.
Continental anticipated receiving these items as part of the
franchise package.

When it was determined that these items

were not part of the franchise, Continental arranged to
lease these items, which had an original cost in excess of
$10,000 (T.222), from Ma's & Pa's for $25 per month (T.193,
248-49, Plaintiffs' Exhibit M ) .

As a part of the leases,

the sum of $1,500 was placed on deposit in the Bank of Utah
to cover breakage, loss, damage and the last month's rent
(T.223-224, 249, 270-272, 380).
During the time Continental operated a restaurant
on the premises, the Roy City Fire Department notified them
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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that exterior fire exits needed to be installed on the
second floor (T.252-253, 325, Plaintiffs' Exhibits N and W ) .
Although the premises had been inspected by the Roy City
Fire Department on several prior occasions, no mention had
ever been made of the need for second floor fire exits
(T.251-253, 325). Roy City had adopted a new fire code in
1965 (T.324); however, since the building had been built
prior to 1965, no new fire exits were required (T.327) until
the fire chief concluded the existing conditions constituted
a distinct hazard to life and property (T.328).
This change occurred in 1972 due to the fact the
second floor was being used by a new business for a new and
different use (T.324, 328, 331, 332). At trial, Mrs. Rizzuto,
the secretary-treasurer of Continental, testified that Ma's
& Pa's was never notified of this problem since "we figured
that was our responsibility to put it up there." (T.251)
In May, 1972, Continental sold their business to
appellant (T.249), who assumed all of their leasehold and
other obligations (T.249, 254, Plaintiffs' Exhibits U and V,
Defendant's Exhibit 2 ) .
Prior to the sale, appellant inspected the premises
and reviewed the operations with Mr. and Mrs. Rizzuto on

- 8 -
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several different occasions (T.250-251),

Appellant was

informed of the obligation to pay the monthly bills after
June 1, 1972, rental on the glassware and dishes (T.265),
and to repair and keep up the premises (T.254).

It was

specifically pointed out to him that the kitchen floor
(T.256) needed to be repaired and that the fire escapes
(T.251) had to be installed.

And, as the Weber County

Health Inspectors testified, there were other items which
needed to be corrected about the time appellant took over
the lease (T.310-312).

Prior to that time, the inspectors

had noted only that the floors were in bad shape and a
lavatory sink was in poor repair (T.311).

And, as Mrs.

Rizzuto indicated, it was the kitchen floors that needed
repair (T.256).
During the time Continental operated the restaurant,
their monthly gross sales had been seasonally improving.
fact, during the 20 month period of time for which records
were available, they failed to pay percentage rental only
twice.

Their monthly sales (T.259-262) were:
Month

Gross Sales

October, 1970
November, 1970
December, 1970
January, 1971

$ 13,216
13,241
13,000
12,616

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In

February, 1971
March, 1971
April, 1971
May, 1971
June 1 to 20, 1971
July 6 to 31, 1971
August, 1971
September, 1971
October, 1971
November, 1971
December, 1971
January, 1972
February, 1972
March, 1972
April, 1972
May, 1972

-

12,870
15,231
13,522
15,051
7,355
8,096
11,200
11,233
12,800
13,044
15,211
11,821
13,044
17,242
16,425
15,529

Prior to October, 1970, Continental had experienced a few
months in which gross sales were less than $10,000 per month
(T.257).

Throughout this period, Continental had periodi-

cally increased its food prices to offset rising food costs
due to inflation (T.266-268).
In this context, Ma's & Pa's consented and permitted Continental to assign their leasehold and other
obligations to appellant (Plaintiffs' Exhibit B).

Although

appellant took over a going business, his monthly gross
sales started an immediate decline.

If appellant's monthly

gross sales are compared with Continental's monthly gross
sales for the corresponding months of each prior year for
which records are available, his monthly gross sales exceed

- 10 -
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those of Continental only in the months of June, 1973, and
June, 1974.

And, he did not p iy any percentage rental.

His

records indicate the following monthly gross sales pattern
(T.284-288):
Month

Sales

June, 1972
July, 1972
August, 1972
September, 1972
October, 1972
November, 1972
December, 1972
January, 1973
February, 1973
March, 1973
April, 1973
May, 1973
June, 1973
July, 1973
August, 1973
September, 1973
October, 1973
November, 1973
December, 1973
January, 1974
February, 1974
March, 1974
April, 1974
May, 1974
June, 1974
July, 1974
August, 1974
September, 1974

$ 11 ,221.31

7 540.01
10, 805.78
9,074.00
9 100.00
9 ,033.00
11;,100.00
6 ,837.00
9,,004.00
9 ,755.00
8 ,933.00
11 ,705.00
7 ,433.00
6 ,078.00
8 ,202.00
7 ,320.00
10 ,458.00
10 ,116.00
12 ,174.00
7 ,327.00
8 ,514.00
10 ,507.00
10 ,193.00
11 ,608.00
7 ,890.00
7 ,229.00
8 ,240.00
7 ,725.00

During this time, app llant also experienced an 81
percent rise in food costs (T.2 9, Plaintiffs * Exhibit Y ) .

- 11 -
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He offset this by increasing his prices or by using smaller
portions of food (T.290-292, 441-442).

This is readily

shown by the relatively stable ratio of cost of goods sold
to gross sales (T.442).
An examination of appellantfs books and records by
respondents' accountant disclosed that the restaurant operated
at a net loss during 1973 and 1974 (T.438-439).

Since

appellant's tax returns for 1972 showed major adjustments
for accounts receivable and accounts payable not otherwise
reflected in their books and records, it was impossible to
determine whether the restaurant operated at a net profit or
loss during the period (T.437,440).

Appellant attributed his

immediate decline in monthly gross sales to the ending of
the Vietnam War during the latter part of 1972 (T.384).
During appellant's occupancy, more repair items
were noted on the health inspectors1 reports (T.304-309,
312, 315-318, Plaintiffs' Exhibits AA and BB).

As the lease

neared an end, an inspection of the premises by the respondents revealed the exterior paint on the building had deteriorated to the point bare wood was exposed (T.180, 345,
354), the furnace room plaster had fallen or been knocked
off where the air conditioner had been removed (T.180,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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338-340, Plaintiffs1 Exhibit C), several broken windows had
not been replaced (T.180, 340), the front door had no handle
and hadn't been painted (T.181, 354, 393-394), the lights in
the entrance hall did not work (T.181), the interior paint
was in poor condition (T.181, 345-346), the floor behind the
living room staircase and along the serving table was in
disrepair (T.181), wallpaper and tile were loose in the
former coffee shop room (T.181), the kitchen freezer compartment walls were falling apart (T.181, 339. 386-387, Plaintiffs1 Exhibits E and G ) , the bathroom basins and fixtures
needed to be cleaned and repaired (T.181, 315, 389, Plaintiffs1 Exhibit F ) , the kitchen dishwashing area floor needed
repair (T.182, 307, 315, 339, 341, 354, 390), the kitchen
walls needed to be cleaned and painted (T.182, 345-346), the
dumbwaiter did not operate and the dumbwaiter had a 2 ' x 3 !
hole in the wall (T.182), the public restroom floor tile was
in bad shape and there were holes in the walls (T.182-183,
315-316, Plaintiffs1 Exhibit D ) , the shrubbery was dying for
lack of care (T.185), the basement drain needed to be fixed
(T.185), and the walls, ceiling and fixtures in the blocked
off restrooms were broken or knocked out (T.185).
Appellant testified he was finished with the
business (T.398) and intended to get out of the business by
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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selling it back to the respondents (T.399) or subleasing it
with an option to buy to a new operator (T.422).

It was in

this context that appellant intended to renew the lease for
a subsequent term (T.177) and that respondent informed the
appellant that commencing October 1, 1974, his monthly rent
would be $900 per month (T.178, Defendant's Exhibit 3 ) .
During the months of March through September,
1974, the respondents and appellant met together several
times to renegotiate the rent (T.178, 179). Among the
factors respondents discussed were the rising costs of living
and the fact they were realizing little or no profit from
their investment (T.178, 375). Appellant claimed he wasn't
making enough money to pay any increased rent and he wouldn't
pay more rent (T.179, 376). During their discussions as the
lease neared the end, the respondents pointed out to appellant
that he had not been maintaining the building in a good
state of repair (T.179-180) and served upon him their demand
(T.184, 185, Plaintiffs' Exhibit I) that the maintenance and
repairs therein specified be completed within 30 days or the
lease would be terminated and forfeited pursuant to paragraph 20 of the lease (T.186, Plaintiffs' Exhibit A ) .
Appellant responded to the demand by letter dated
October 15, 1974, denying for the most part that any repairs
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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or maintenance was needed.

During a meeting between the

parties in the office of Mr. King in early November, 1974,
the appellant replied that he would make the repairs he
thought were needed when he felt like it (T/187).

He later

stated he had no obligation to spend a large amount of money
to keep the premises in good repair until the monthly rental
had been renegotiated (T.388, 397).
The lease rent for each renewal period was to be
renegotiated based on

!f

[f] actors of tax increases, cost of

business increases or decreases, business volume and success,
and insurance costs and other reasonable allowances.!f
(Exhibit D to Plaintiffs' Exhibit A)
At this point no agreement had been reached fixing
a new monthly rental.

Further correspondence was exchanged

regarding the factors each party thought should control in
arriving at a new monthly rental.

The appellant pointed out

that no increased rent was warranted because:
(a)

real property taxes had declined 6

percent over the past three years;
(b)

personal property taxes had remained the

(c)

the cost of doing business had risen 81

same;

percent; and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(d)

business volume had declined 24 percent

(Plaintiffs1 Exhibits K, Y and Z ) .
At trial, appellant pointed out that the leased machinery
and equipment was in constant need of repairs and he had
unceasing expenses (T.385, 388). This, however, is not borne
out by his books and records (Plaintiffs1 Exhibits FF, GG,
HH and II).
The respondents replied saying they sought a fair
rate of return on their investment and that, all factors
considered, it should be over $900 per month.

They believed

this was warranted based on
(a)

the annual depreciation assuming the

building was replaced at current costs;
(b)

the current rental per square foot of

the space paid by similar businesses; and
(c)

the annual return one would receive if

the property were sold and the proceeds invested in
interest bearing accounts (Plaintiffs1 Exhibit C).
Although further correspondence was exchanged
(Plaintiffs1 Exhibits L, P and Q and Defendant's Exhibit 5 ) ,
no agreement was reached.

During this period of time, Roy

City informed appellant that fire exits had to be installed
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in the second floor before his business license would be
renewed in March, 1975, for use of the second floor (Plaintiffs1 Exhibit N).

Appellant in turn demanded that respon-

dents undertake to install and pay for the fire exits (Defendant's Exhibit 5), which they refused to do (Plaintiffs1
Exhibit 0).

Appellant estimated loss of business from being

unable to use the second floor was 10 to 20 percent (T.386).
However, starting in April, 1975, appellant's business
records are unavailable (T.426).
On February 14, 1976, it appeared to respondents
that no resolution of the matter could be reached, and they
served notice on appellant's counsel that the lease was
terminated and forfeited for failure to make repairs and
directed that the premises be vacated within five days
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit Q).

Appellant was also personally

served with the same notice to vacate the premises on February 26, 1976 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit R).

The respondents

instituted suit on February 26, 1976, to obtain judicial
resolution of the matter (Complaint).
On May 10, 1975, respondents filed a Motion for
Judgment on the pleadings contending that the renewal option
was void for vagueness, and oral argument was held on May 20,
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1975.

On May 29, 1975, Judge Hyde ruled that the renewal

option was sufficiently certain that it was not void as a
matter of law.

Respondents subsequently filed an Amended

Complaint realleging the original allegations and adding
allegations for unlawful detainer, damages, and accounting
(Amended Complaint).
As the trial date neared, appellant covered up the
holes in the kitchen and restroom walls with formica and, in
the process, lowered the restroom ceiling (T.387-388, 414).
However, there is no evidence indicating that sheetrock was
first installed as required by the Roy City fire code (T.341).
At trial, a real estate broker testified that a
fair rental for the premises, assuming the maintenance and
repairs had been made and the tenant was paying the taxes
and insurance, was between $800 and $1,000 per month (T.362).
In fixing the monthly rent, the lessee would be seeking to
fix his costs over a period of time (T.367) and the lessors
would be gambling on the fact the rental property value and
so on would not increase to the point they would be losing
money (T.367).

In determining what to accept as a monthly

rent, the lessors would set the base monthly rent at the
very minimum they could get by with to help the person

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 18 -

establish himself in the business (T.369).

In so doing, the

lessors would consider the value of their investment in the
property, the rate of return they would be getting from the
monthly income, who would take care of the maintenance, who
would be paying the taxes and insurance, and the fair rental
value of the property (T.369-371).

Respondents felt that

such a monthly minimum base rent should be $1,000, but they
were limited by the lease to a maximum of $900 per month
(T.190).
The lease calls for the respondents to pay the
general property taxes and maintain fire and hazard insurance
covering the building (Plaintiffs1 Exhibit A ) . The respondents paid the following general property taxes: 1969,
$2,046.94; 1970, $2,549.14; 1971, $2,083.63; 1972, $2,163.06;
1973, $2,085.23; and 1974, $2,030.80.

The property was

reappraised on or about March 27, 1974 (T.335), and, based
on the reappraisal, taxes for 1975 were fixed at $2,212.51
(T.297).

As a result of the reappraisal, the building

assessed value increased from $14,040 to $15,740 (T.299),
the real property assessed value increased from $5,720 to
$15,540 (T.299), and the personal property increased from
$1,000 in 1969 to $1,300 in 1975 (T.300).

In Utah, all
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property is assessed at 20 percent of fair market value (T.336).
During 1975, the annual insurance premium was $828 (T.233).
The estimated cost to repair and correct the
maintenance deficiencies was $4,564, $1,940 estimated by the
painter (T.347) and $2,624 estimated by the general contractor
(T.339).
The matter was tried before the Honorable John F.
Wahlquist on December 16, 1975.

Judge Wahlquist rendered a

Memorandum Decision December 30, 1975, and directed that
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a Judgment and
Decree be prepared for entry which reflected the unlawful
holdover of appellant, fixed delayed maintenance at $4,000,
set the monthly rental at $900 per month, and awarded damages
in the sum of $900 per month from and after October 1, 1974,
to January 15, 1976.

The Court refused to award treble

damages for unlawful detainer, but ordered appellant to
vacate the premises on or before January 15, 1976.

No

judgment was rendered against Continental.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING THAT THE LEASE RENEWAL OPTIONS WERE NOT VOID.

- 20 -
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A lease is both a grant of an estate in land and a
contract for the possession and use thereof by the lessee in
return for payment to the lessor of compensation or rent.
State v. Rawson, 210 Ore. 593, 312 P.2d 849, 853 (1957).

If

a contract is not definite and certain with respect to all
essential terms, it is void for lack of certainty and cannot
be specifically enforced.

D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Brown, 439

F.2d 926, 929 (10 Cir. 1969); Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 U.2d
61, 362 P.2d 427, 428-29 (1961).
The lease provides that rents for each renewal
term will be renegotiated based on factors of tax increases,
cost of business increases and decreases, business volume
and success, and insurance costs and other reasonable allowances . Where the renewal option leaves for future negotiation the formula and the factors making up the formula,
which is the situation presently before the Court, such a
renewal option has been declared unenforceable for lack of
certainty and definiteness.

Schlusselberg v. Rubin, 465

S.W.2d 226, 227-28 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); Walker v. Keith,
382 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. 1966); and Young v. Sweet, 266 N.C. 623,
146 S.E.2d 669, 670 (1966).

See also, Slayter v. Pasley,

199 Ore. 616, 264 P.2d 444, 449 (1953).
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This view is not followed universally.

Some

jurisdictions follow the minority view that uncertainty
notwithstanding, the parties will be deemed to have agreed
upon a "reasonable rental11 since the renewal option was part
of the consideration which induced the lessee to execute the
lease.

Hall v. Weatherford, 32 Ariz. 370, 259 P. 282, 285

(1927); and Young v. Nelson, 121 Wash. 285, 209 P. 515, 517
(1922).

This view overlooks the fact that "a party must

have an enforceable contract before he has a right to enforce
it."

Walker v. Keith, supra at 201; Russell v. Valentine,

14 U.2d 26, 376 P.2d 548, 549 (1962); and Valcarce v. Bitters,
supra.

Cf., EFCO Distributing, Inc., v. Perrin, 17 U.2d 375,

412 P.2d 615, 616 (1966).
Appellant has not demonstrated that he had a valid
enforceable lease renewal option.

Appellant's predecessor-

in-interest, Continental, prepared the lease (T.175-177).
In so doing, it deleted the fixed renewal rent of $500 per
month plus 4 percent of gross sales on $10,000 per month and
substituted a clause that called for the mere renegotiation
of rentals with the proviso that the amount could not exceed
$900 per month.
If Continental had intended to commit the respon-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 22 -

dents to a fixed predetermined rent for each renewal term,
it should have retained the formula set forth in the Earnest
Money Agreement.

This it did not do, and appellant is

precluded at this late date from seeking a reformation of
the agreement so to do (Para, 34 of Plaintiffs1 Exhibit A ) .
The parties have engaged in extensive negotiations which
have not resulted in an agreement on the renewal term rents•
The parties have been unable to agree on the factors to be
considered in making up a renewal rent formula, much less
agree on the weight each factor should receive.

In view of

the uncertainty, vagueness, and lack of any specific renewal
rental formula, the renewal option should be declared void
as a matter of law.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING APPELLANT
LIABLE FOR THE DELAYED MAINTENANCE DAMAGES.
As appellant pointed out in his Brief at 3-4,
upon assignment, he assumed the lease together with its
responsibilities and obligations.

There is no evidence

affirmatively indicating that appellant did not assume the
entire responsibility to repair the items not corrected by
Continental during its possession of the premises, together
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with the obligation to repair and maintain the premises
after he took possession.

The trial courtfs finding that

appellant was responsible for the maintenance and repair of
the premises should be upheld.

Radley v. Smith, 6 U.2d 314,

313 P.2d 465, 466-67 (1957).
Appellant's Brief points out his testimony denying
for the most part any need for repairs and maintenance with
respect to the premises (Brief at 10-11, T.389-395).

The

respondents introduced considerable testimony indicating
quite the contrary (Statement of Facts, supra).
After listening to witnesses, including appellant,
and observing their demeanor for two full days, the trial
court sifted through the conflicting evidence and concluded
that appellant had not maintained or repaired the premises
in accordance with his lease obligations and had failed to
comply with respondents1 notice dated September 24, 1974.
Under such circumstances, this Court should not disturb the
trial court's findings unless a review of the evidence
clearly preponderates against such a finding.
Parry, 2 U.2d 217, 271 P.2d 852, 855 (1954).

Millard v.
This can only

be accomplished if the appellant's testimony is believed in
every respect, totally disregarding the testimony of respon-
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dents and of other disinterested witnesses.

Respondents

believe the record when viewed in its entirety will support
and sustain the trial court's findings in this regard.
In addition to these items, second floor fire
escapes needed to be installed.

The evidence shows, and the

trial court correctly found, that this obligation belonged
to Continental (T.251) and was assumed by the appellant.
Appellant attempts to shift this burden to the respondents
by reference to paragraph 15 of the lease (Plaintiffs'
Exhibit A ) .

This paragraph reads as follows:

Lessor covenants that he has good and marketable
title to the demised premises in fee simple absolute,
subject only to existing mortgage thereon, and that
the same is subject to no leases, tenancies, agreements,
restrictions and defects in title affecting the demised
premises or the rights granted Lessee in this Lease;
and that there are no restrictive covenants, zoning
or other ordinances or regulations applicable to the
demised premises which will prevent Lessee from
conducting its business.
When the lease was executed, this covenant had
been complied with in every respect.

The building was

constructed in 1948 (T.205) and remodeled following a fire
prior to the effective date of the Roy City Fire Code adopted
in 1965 (T.326, 327). Buildings then in existence did not
have to comply with this fire code until the particular use
made of the building by the occupant caused the fire chief
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to certify that this use constituted a safety hazard (T.328).
Even though Continental remodeled the second floor for
patron eating facilities by removing the dance floor and
installing public restroom facilities, no safety hazard
existed by virtue of occupant's use of the building during
1969, 1970 or 1971 (T.329).

During this period of time, the

building and the use thereof had been investigated and
inspected by the fire department (T.329, 330). The fire
department made no mention of the need for second floor fire
escapes in its reports.

However, during the early part of

1972, the situation changed.

The fire department again

investigated and inspected the building and the manner it
was being used and concluded that second floor fire escapes
were warranted and directed their installation (T.252-253,
325, Plaintiffs1 Exhibits N and W ) .
At trial, Continental's secretary-treasurer testified it was their duty to install the second floor fire
escapes and that appellant had been specifically informed of
this necessity prior to the date he assumed the lease (T.251).
In such circumstances, the burden of installing fire escapes
properly belongs to the lessee.

Lodge Room Co. v. Pacific

Bond & Investment Co., 84 Wash. 150, 146 P. 376, 377 (1915);
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Pross v. Excelsior Cleaning & Dyeing Co., 110 Misc. 195,
179 NYS 176 (1910); Taylor v. Finnigan, 189 Mass. 568, 76
N.E. 203, 205 (1905); and Johnson v. Snow, 102 Mo. App. 233,
76 S.W. 675 (1903), Aff'd 201 Mo. 450, 100 S.W. 5 (1907).
Cf., ELL and L. Investment Co. v. International Trust Co.,
132 Colo. 137, 286 P.2d 338 (1955).
The lessorfs covenants contained in paragraph 15
of the lease are not couched in language designed to impose
a continuing obligation on lessor.

It speaks of conditions

existing only at the time the lease was executed.

This is

not a lease prepared by the respondents (T.175-177).

Quite

to the contrary, it was prepared by Continental and should
be construed against appellant.
at 549.

Russell v. Valentine, supra

The only continuing obligation imposed on respondents

and Ma's & Pa's so far as this action is concerned is their
duty to comply with the law as set forth in paragraph 22 of
the lease.

This they have done at all times throughout the

term of this lease.

The trial court correctly included the

installation of second floor fire escapes as a maintenance
deficiency.
The appellant offered no evidence indicating that
the repairs could be made for less than $1,940 for the
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painter and $2,624 for the general contractor.

The trial

court concluded that such repairs would place the premises
in better shape than they were at the time they were rented
to Continental, but not grossly so, and reduced respondents
damages to $4,000.
Respondents believe the clear weight of the evidence supports the trial court's findings, and the damage
award of $4,000 against appellant should be affirmed.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN AWARDING FURTHER
DAMAGES BASED ON A RENTAL RATE OF $900 PER MONTH.
Following the expiration of the original term of
the lease, an option was granted to the lessee to renew the
lease for two consecutive five year periods upon the same
terms and conditions
" . . . except that the rental amount of the lease
will be renegotiated; however, maximum total monthly
rental shall not exceed $900.00 per month. Factors
of tax increases, cost of business increases or
decreases, business volume and success, insurance
costs and other reasonable allowances will be the
basis for terms of negotiation.M
Appellant has omitted reference to "costs of business increases and decreases" in the factors cited on p. 13 of his
Brief.
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In fixing the renewal term rental at $900 per
month and awarding damages based on this figure, the court
had before it a fairly complete history of the business
which had been conducted on the premises.

The respondents

have summarized this history in its Statement of Facts,
supra.
Appellant has directed the Court's attention to
those factors he believes to be controlling in reversing the
trial court's determination to fix the rent at $900 per
month (Brief of Appellant at 12-13).

The respondents will

show that all of the specified factors in the lease do not
favor appellant.
The real estate taxes have increased.
averaged over the period 1969-1974, is $112.86.

This increase,
The real

property was reappraised on March 27, 1974 (T.335).

The

fair market value used by the appraisers in fixing the
appraisal value of the property for 1975 was $162,900 (T.299,
300, 336). Based on this reappraisal, taxes for 1975 were
fixed at $2,212.51 (T.297).

Under the terms of the lease,

respondents paid the taxes, and the insurance which had
increased from $795 (T.234) in 1974 to $828 (T.233) in 1975.
There is no dispute that appellant's business
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volume decreased (Statement of Facts, supra at 11) when
compared to Continental's business volume (Statement of
Facts, supra at 9 ) .

Out of the 28 months appellant operated

the premises, only ten of those months showed gross sales in
excess of $10,000 per month.

The average gross sales for

these ten months is $10,988.80.

The average gross sales for

the entire 28 months is $9,111.50.

For the 20 month period

reported by Continental, its average monthly gross sales
were $13,087.35.

Only two of those months were below the

$10,000 mark and, in both of those months, Continental had
closed its doors for employee vacations.
Appellant's decline in volume has resulted in a
considerable monthly rental loss to respondents, when compared with Continental's volume.

Continental paid percentage

rent 18 out of 20 months (90%), while appellant paid on 10
out of 28 months (35.7%).

This drastic decline is compounded

by the fact that appellant paid percentage rent on the
average monthly sum of $998.80, while Continental paid
percentage rent on the average monthly sum of $3,087.35.
One must bear in mind that both Continental and
appellant increased their food prices during the lease term
to offset the rising costs of doing business attributed to
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inflation.

Appellant testified that his products had increased

81 percent during the time he operated the restaurant.

This

increase was passed on to appellant's patrons (T.290-292,
441-442).

Respondents, while watching their monthly rental

income drop, had no means by which to offset the inflationary
effect on their monthly rental income.

Using appellant's 81

percent inflation figure and applying that to the $500
monthly base rental, respondents would be justified in
demanding and holding out for $900 per month rental.
During the period of negotiation with appellant,
respondents have sought to obtain a fair and reasonable
return on their investment by increasing rentals from $500
to $900 per month.

Respondents testified that they were

losing money by renting the premises to Continental for less
than $900 per month (T.212).

They were willing to take a

fixed monthly rental of $500 per month and gamble on making
up the difference on the monthly percentage rent since
Continental represented it would give up the lease if its
monthly gross sales were $10,000 or less.

This gamble has

not paid off in their favor, and they now seek not to be
made completely whole, but to offset the effect of inflation,
pass on their increased fixed expenses, and receive a fair
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return on their investment by increasing the monthly base
rent.
As with any business or investment, the true
measure of its success is the monetary return one receives
on the time and money one has invested.
has not been a success.

Appellant's business

He has lost money in 1973 and 1974.

However, his misfortune should not be shifted to respondents.
This is particularly true when one considers that the respondents are trustees managing the property for several unspecified beneficiaries.

They have a fiduciary obligation to

preserve the capital investment and obtain a fair return for
the beneficiaries.
The total monthly rent paid by appellant for
September, 1972, through September, 1974, is contained in
Plaintiffs1 Exhibits FF, GG and HH.

After reducing the .

amount by $25 for the monthly glassware rental, appellant
paid $6,033.13 rent from October, 1972, to September, 1973,
and $6,157.04 rent from October, 1973, to September, 1974.
From these amounts, respondents paid $2,085.23 in taxes for
1973 and an unknown amount for insurance, and they paid
$2,030.80 for taxes in 1974 and $795 for insurance.
a net investment return of $3,331.24 in 1974.
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This is

Using the tax

assessor's fair market value of the premises of $162,900 for
1974, this amounts to an annual return on invested capital
of 2.04 percent.
Raising the rents to $900 per month from October,
1974, to September, 1975, would result in the receipt of
$10,800 rent.

After payment of 1975 taxes in the sum of

$2,212.51 and insurance in the sum of $828, this would leave
respondents with a net investment return of $3,042.51, or an
annual return on invested capital of 4.76 percent.
The trial court found, and appellant has not
contested the findings, that:
Mr. Van Antwerp invested approximately $15,000
for the purchase of Continental's lease. He has not
been as skilled an operator as Continental. He has
seen a steady decline in gross sales and the number
of patrons served. He has become discouraged. His
books and records have never disclosed any profit or
any possibility on the sales history up to date of
paying him a reasonable wage for conducting the business. He desires to be free of the leasehold obligation. He searches for an opportunity to recoup part
of his original investment (Finding of Fact No. 51
and Memorandum Decision at 5).
Mr. Van Antwerp's desire to recoup part of his
original investment in the Sublease has caused him
to take the following position:
(a) He believes that the only way he can
achieve this is to remain in possession and
thereby withhold from the plaintiffs a reasonable
return on the ownership of the premises until he
is paid a sum of money to leave.
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(b) He insists that he is entitled to a
renegotiated lease and cites the present sad
state of gross sales to imply that the monthly
rental for the first renewal term under the
lease should be an even lower figure than he
was paying at the time the lease expired (Finding of Fact No. 52 and Memorandum Opinion at
5, 6).
By the time the first renewal term of the lease
commenced, the restaurant business of Mr. Van Antwerp
on the premises had failed, and he hoped to force the
plaintiffs to buy out his interest in the lease (Finding of Fact No. 53 and Memorandum Opinion at 6 ) .
It was never anticipated that the lease would be
used for such a deceitful purpose (Finding of Fact No.
54 and Memorandum Opinion at 6).
All factors considered, the trial court correctly concluded
that it was appellant who failed to renegotiate the monthly
lease rental, not respondents.
The respondents believe that the trial court gave
consideration to all of the factors cited by appellant as a
basis for fixing damages in terms of monthly rent and proper
resolved the matter in favor of respondents.
The cases cited by appellant are not in opposition
to this conclusion.

In Graseck v. Bankers Trust Company,

315 Mich. 650, 24 N.W.2d 426 (1946), the trial court fixed
the renewal term rentals at $275 per month.

The plaintiff

contended it should have been fixed at $125 per month, while
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the defendant sought $350 per month.

Both parties appealed.

The trial court's finding was affirmed.
At trial, testimony was introduced by defendant
that "the then current rate of rentals in the vicinity of
like properties . . . [was] considerably higher, [and] might
seem presently to justify the fixing of a higher rate of
rental."
The appellate court did not increase the rental
from $275 per month to $350 per month in favor of defendant,
nor did it reduce the rental from $275 per month to $125 in
favor of plaintiff.

The court concluded that

. . . the trial judge might well have been somewhat impressed by the testimony showing that in 1941
there were negotiations relative to reduction of the
$100 monthly rental provided in the lease under which
plaintiff then occupied the premises; and also that the
rental of a former tenant was reduced "because his
business was such that he couldn't stand to pay $200.00
per month;" and further by the fact that the fair
rental value in a prospective five year lease is not
necessarily controlled by presently prevailing high
rentals.
There is no indication in the opinion that testimony regarding
the "current rate of rentals in the vicinity" for like
property was inadmissible.

The trial court judge may well

have relied on such testimony, but relied on other factors
pointed out by the appellate court in reducing said sum to
arrive at the monthly rental.
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Appellant has not introduced any evidence indicating negotiations to further reduce the rental at the
outset of this lease, or that the Hicks1 monthly rent was
reduced, or that a fair rental for the renewal terra of the
lease was other than what the trial court awarded.
In Diettrich v. J. J. Newberry Co., 172 Wash. 18,
19 P.2d 115, 117 (1933), the lessee had two leases on a
single building.

The ground and basement floors were leased

pursuant to a five year lease, and the balance of the building
was leased on a 25 year lease.

It was the determination of

a fair rental for the renewal option of the five year lease
that concerned the court.

The court concluded that the fair

rental for the ground and basement floors of the building
could not be determined by reference to the fair rental
value of the entire building.

The test for determining the

renewal rent upon an extension of the five year lease
is the reasonable rental value of the ground floor
and basement taken alone for that specified period. .
. . The amount of rent, therefore, was to be determined from competition that might arise between exclusively responsible bidders in a fair and open market that is, by the market value of the premises at the
time of renewal. IdL at 117.
The rental could not exceed the highest rental market value
of the leased premises.
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The respondents have not leased contiguous property
to the appellant and are not seeking to fix the rental value
of one property based on a fair rental value of both properties.

Consistent with the theory in both Gfaseck and

Diettrich, they have introduced testimony of a real estate
broker to show what other responsible restaurant owners are
paying in terms of rent and to show what the other "responsible bidders" would pay to rent this property "in a fair
and open market.11

The broker testified that this would be

somewhere between $800 and $1,000 per month, with the lessee
paying all the taxes and insurance.
In

Parsons v. Ball, 205 Ky. 793, 266 S.W. 649

(1924), the lessee allowed the premises to fall into disrepair during the original lease term.

The lessor would not

recognize the lessee's renewal of the lease since the lessee
had not kept the premises in good repair.
nized the renewal option because

The court recog-

tf

[t]he contract does not

provide in terms for forfeiture of the leased premises, or
the lessee's rights under the lease, in case he fails to
keep the houses in proper repair. . . ." Id., at 650.
The lease before the court in Parsons does not
even remotely resemble the lease before this Court.
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Not

only does appellant's lease have a forfeiture clause, but in
event of breach of the repair covenants, it states "any such
default shall, at the option of the Lessor, constitute a
forfeiture . . ." (Para. 20 of Plaintiffs1 Exhibit A ) .
In compliance with this paragraph, respondents
served notice on appellant by letter dated September 24,
1974, to correct the repair and maintenance deficiencies
within 30 days after notice or the lease would be forfeited.
No major repairs were undertaken by appellant, and by notice
dated February 12, 1975, respondents declared a forfeiture
of appellant's lease and gave him five days to vacate the
premises, which he failed to do (Plaintiffs' Exhibits Q and
R

)

.

.

••:......•,:•:•,-

,;*-;'

^ - v , - , : : . . - , .

Appellant contends that respondents' notice is
defective and does not comply with Utah Code Ann. 1953, §7836-3.

The Court's attention is directed to the form of

forfeiture notices which were approved in Beneficial Life
Insurance Company v. Dennett, 24 U.2d 310, 470 P.2d 406,
407-08 (1970).

Although those forfeiture notices were

served to comply with paragraph 16(A) of a Uniform Real
Estate Contract, the respondents believe the same form of
notices is applicable to a forfeiture declared pursuant to
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paragraph 20 of the lease presently before the Court.

These

notices informed the appellant that the respondents elected
to declare a forfeiture of the lease upon the failure of
appellant to cure the defects and that appellant would, in
the event of such a failure, become a tenant at will.

They

should be approved and confirmed in all respects.
POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO TREBLE
DAMAGES PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, §78-36-10.
The appellant admitted service of respondents1
letter dated September 24, 1974, directing that certain
repairs be undertaken within 30 days or the lease would be
forfeited (Amended Complaint para. 18 and Amended Answer
para. 17); admitted service of respondents' notice dated
February 12, 1975 (Amended Complaint para. 21 and 22,
Amended Answer para. 20 and 21); and admitted his refusal to
vacate the premises pursuant to said notice (Amended Complaint
para. 23, Amended Answer para. 22). The trial court found
that the indicated repairs and maintenance had not been
completed (Findings of Fact Nos. 34 and 35 and Memorandum
Decision at 5-6) , found damages to be $4,000 (Finding of
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Fact No. 39 and Memorandum Decision at 6 ) , found appellant's
failure to vacate wrongful and an unlawful holdover (Finding
of Fact No. 56 and Memorandum Decision at 6-7), and found
damages in the nature of rent after forfeiture to be $900
per month (Finding of Fact No. 57 and Memorandum Decision at
7).

'•

The trial court considered but refused to find
treble damages for the wrongful and unlawful holdover (Finding of Fact No. 59 and Memorandum Decision at 7). The
respondents believe this finding of the trial court is
incorrect.

Utah Code Annotated 1953, §78-36-10 states in

part
. . . judgment shall be rendered against the
defendant guilty of the forcible entry, or forcible or
unlawful detainer, for rent and for three times the
amount of damages thus assessed.
This is the exact same language which the court
had occasion to review in Forrester v. Cook, 77 U. 137, 292
P. 206, 213 (1930).

The court states

This language has been held to require the entry
of judgment for three times the amount of damages,
after a finding of damages by the [court]. Eccles v.
Union Pacific Coal Co., 15 Utah, 14, 48 P. 148. That
action was one for forcible and unlawful detainer, but
the statute applies as well to unlawful detainer. The
statute as construed in Eccles v. U. P. Coal Co.,
supra, makes it mandatory upon the court to render
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judgment for three times the amount of damages thus
assessed. Ld. at 214.
The court goes on to define what is meant by the term Mdamagesff
which are trebled.

The appellant correctly points out to

the Court that such damages must be the natural and proximate consequence of the unlawful detainer (Brief of Appellant at 17), but he failed to point out to the Court what
those consequences were.

The court in Forrester said

The damages which may be recovered in an action
such as this are measured by the rule that they must be
the natural and proximate consequences of the acts
complained of and nothing more. Rents and profits, or
rental value of the premises, during detention are
included in damages, (emphasis added), IcL at 211.
The second claim for relief in respondents1 Amended
Complaint deals strictly with the fact appellant refused to
vacate the premises as directed.

It is the unlawful deten-

tion of the premises which triggers the measure of damages.
The court stated
Clearly the loss of the value of the use and
occupation of the premises, or the rental value thereof,
during the period when the premises were unlawfully
withheld from plaintiff, is a damage suffered by her.
While damages may not be restricted to the rental value
and may include more, yet the rental value during the
unlawful withholding of possession is the minimum of
damages. Ld. at 214.
In this case, appellant was in unlawful detention
from and after five days of service of respondents1 notice
- 41 -
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on his legal counsel, or at the latest March 4, 1975.

This

unlawful detainer continued through January 15, 1976, when
the sheriff served the Writ of Possession placing respondents
in possession of the premises.
So there would be no misunderstanding regarding
damages, the court went on to distinquish

,!

rents which

accrued before forfeitureM from "damages accruing after
forfeiture" based on the rental value of the unlawfully
detained premises.

It stated

Rents, which may not be trebled, are such as
accrue before termination of the tenancy. After the
tenancy has been terminated by notice required by
statute, the person in unlawful possession is not owing
rent under the contract, but must respond in damages
pursuant to law. Rental value or reasonable value of
the use and occupation of the premises becomes an
element of damages for retaining possession. This is
not rent, it is damages. JA. at 214.
Respondents have suffered additional damages as a
natural and proximate result of appellant's unlawful holdover
in that the condition of the premises continued to decline.
The building exterior was not painted and the bare wood
continued to weather, the public restroom and kitchen floors
were not repaired, the kitchen walls continued to deteriorate
from the moisture put out by the ice machine as a result of
appellantfs refusal to relocate it, and the blocked off
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restrooms continued to be exposed to the effects of inclement
weather.

Respondents were unable to correct these deficiencies

as a result of appellant's refusal to vacate and had no opportunity so to do prior to January 15, 1975.
The portion of the trial court's Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Decree denying treble
damages for unlawful detainer should be reversed and the
matter remanded to the trial court for the entry of appropriate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment
and Decree awarding respondents the treble damages to which
they were properly entitled.

The respondents should be

awarded their costs and a reasonable attorney's fee in conjunction with this appeal,

CONCLUSION
It is submitted:
(a)

The trial court erred as a matter of law

in not concluding that the lease renewal option was void
for vagueness and uncertainty.
(b)

The trial court erred as a matter of law

in not awarding treble damages for unlawful detainer.
(c)

In all other respects, the trial court's
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Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and
Decree should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
CHRISTENSEN, GARDINER, JENSEN
& EVANS

Elwood P. Powell
900 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Plaintiffs,
Respondents, and CrossAppellants
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